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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ANGEL BALDERRAMA, : Case No. 20020786-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Angel Balderrama ("AppellantM or "Balderrama") appeals 
from a conviction for Driving Under the Influence, a class B misdemeanor. R. 35. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") was appointed at 
arraignment to represent Balderrama. Balderrama was brought before the trial court 
without counsel after he did not appear for trial and was subsequently picked up on a 
bench warrant. The first issue on appeal is whether Balderrama's conviction and jail 
sentence should be vacated because he did not make a constitutionally valid waiver of his 
right to counsel prior to pleading guilty. 
Preservation. Balderrama's claim that his plea should be vacated because he was 
deprived of his right counsel was preserved. R. 26, 66:2-9. Balderrama also argued that 
Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654 (2002) applied, thereby preserving a claim that a jail 
sentence or suspended jail sentence could not be imposed. Alternatively, even if the 
claims were not preserved, this Court can review the claim under the plain error doctrine. 
See discussion infra at 24-27. 
Standard of Review. The question of whether a defendant knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and 
fact. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,914 (Utah 1998). The trial court's factual findings 
are therefore reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228. ^ 5. 29P.3d680. In the event the 
claim is reviewed under the doctrine of plain error, Balderrama must show that "'(i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.'" State v. Dean. 2002 UT App 323, TJ3, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. Hittle . 
2002 UT App 134,1|5, 47 P.3d 101). 
Issue #2: In taking the plea, the trial judge did not comply with due process or 
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ("rule 11"). Defense counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and pointed out that Balderrama did not understand 
the rights he was waiving when he pled guilty, but focused primarily on the denial of the 
right to counsel. The second issue is whether the plea should be vacated based on the 
due process and rule 11 violations regardless of whether defense counsel challenged the 
plea on those grounds in the trial court. 
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Preservation. Balderrama filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea which 
was heard and denied by the trial judge. R. 26, 66. Although Balderrama focused on the 
deprivation of his right to counsel as the basis for withdrawing his plea, he also informed 
the trial court that he was not informed of his rights when he pled guilty, thereby 
preserving his due process and rule 11 claims for review. Alternatively, these claims can 
be reviewed under the doctrine of plain error. See. Dean, 2002 UT App 323,1fl|4-9 (an 
appellate court can review a guilty plea for plain error when a defendant timely moves to 
withdraw the guilty plea on other grounds). 
Standard of Review. ""The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly 
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness."'" State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^6, 
996 P.2d 1065, affirmed, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting State v. Benvenuto . 1999 
UT 60, 893 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Holland , 921 P.2d 430, 433 
(Utah 1996))). To the extent the guilty pleas are reviewed under the plain error doctrine, 
Balderrama "'has the burden of showing (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 
%3 (further citation omitted); see discussion infra at 40-43. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following rule and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B: 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
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Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 11, 2001, the state filed an Information charging Balderrama with 
driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and three other driving related charges. 
R. 2, 8. Balderrama appeared for arraignment on December 13, 2001 and requested that 
counsel be appointed to represent him. R. 14, 53; 69:2. Balderrama told the judge at 
arraignment that he intended to fight the charge. R. 69:2. The trial court appointed LDA 
to represent Balderrama. R. 14, 53. 
At a pretrial conference on February 4, 2001, a jury trial was scheduled for 
March 19, 2002. R. 53-4. Defense counsel was present on March 19, 2002, but 
Balderrama did not appear. R. 54. The judge issued a bench warrant based on the failure 
to appear. R. 16-17, 54. 
Balderrama was booked on the bench warrant on June 6, 2002. R. 55. He was in 
jail and appeared before the trial judge on June 10, 2002 for a bench warrant hearing. 
R. 55. Counsel was not present. At the bench warrant hearing, acting without counsel, 
Balderrama pleaded guilty to DUI. R. 55, 65. The judge ordered that a presentence 
report be prepared and released Balderrama pending sentencing. R. 55. The judge also 
reappointed LDA for the purposes of sentencing. R. 55. 
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On July 17, 2002, prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a timely motion to 
withdraw Balderrama's guilty plea. R. 26, 56; see. motion to withdraw guilty plea in 
Addendum C. The motion was argued on July 29, 2002, prior to imposition of sentence. 
R. 56-7, 66. The trial judge denied the motion and sentenced Balderrama to 180 days in 
jail; the judge suspended 178 of those days and required Balderrama to serve two days in 
jail. R. 34, 35, 56-7. Balderrama filed a timely notice of appeal on August 21, 2002. 
R.36. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the Information, a highway patrol trooper saw Balderrama make an 
abrupt lane change without signaling, then travel at 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per 
hour speed zone. R. 3-4. The trooper stopped the vehicle Balderrama was driving and 
subsequently arrested Balderrama for DUI and other driving related charges. R. 3-4. At 
the arraignment held on December 13, 2001, the judge appointed LDA to represent 
Balderrama. R. 14, 53. At a pretrial conference held on February 4, 2002, the matter 
was scheduled for a jury trial on March 19, 2002. R. 53-4. Defense counsel appeared at 
the scheduled jury trial but Balderrama did not; the judge issued a bench warrant for 
Balderrama's arrest. R. 16-17. 
Balderrama was booked on that bench warrant on June 6, 2002. R. 55. After 
being held in jail for several days, Balderrama was brought before the judge on June 10, 
2002. R. 65. Counsel was not present. R. 65. After Balderrama attempted to explain 
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why he had not been at the jury trial, the trial judge indicated that Balderrama would be 
brought back before the court at 1:30 p.m. that day. R. 65:3. Balderrama told the judge 
that he had another court date at that time. R. 65:3. The trial judge then told Balderrama 
the matter would be rescheduled two weeks later on June 24th at 1:30 p.m. and that 
Balderrama's attorney would be notified. R. 65:3. 
After being told that the matter would not be heard for two weeks, Balderrama 
asked if things could be resolved that day. R. 65:3. In response to that request, the judge 
asked Balderrama if he wanted to waive his right to an attorney, and Balderrama said that 
he did because he just wanted to get out of jail to "take care of [his] kids." R. 65:3-4. 
The trial judge did not discuss the dangers and disadvantages of representing one's self 
or otherwise conduct the colloquy necessary to establish a waiver of the right to counsel. 
R. 65. The entire exchange regarding the right to counsel is set forth below: 
THE COURT: We'll have you come back at 1:30 this afternoon - -
MR. BALDERRAMA: I have a - -1 have another afternoon court, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll come back on June 24th at 1:30. Set it for pre-
trial, we'll notify your attorney that you're here and we'll see if we can resolve it 
then. If not, we'll set it for trial. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I would like to resolve it today if there - - if there's any 
possible way, your Honor. I would really like to resolve it today. I want to take 
care of everything. I would like to start - - whatever's going to happen, I would 
like to happen today, if you don't mind, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Balderrama, you are entitled to an attorney, do you understand 
that? 
6 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: If you can't afford one, we'd appoint one for you; do you 
understand that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is anybody forcing you to do this? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: No, your Honor. I just want to get out so I can take care 
of my kid, your Honor. I just want to get ready and do my time and if there's any, 
just want to get - get it over with, so I can get out and take care of my kids, your 
Honor, to — 
R. 65:3-4; see transcript of bench warrant/plea hearing in Addendum D. 
After this discussion about proceeding without counsel, the trial court asked the 
prosecutor whether any plea bargain was available. R. 65:4-5. The prosecutor did not 
have a file and indicated that it had been a long time since he had done a DUI case, but 
said that he thought the standard offer of dismissing the minor traffic matters in exchange 
for a plea on the DUI would be appropriate. R. 65:5. The judge then asked Balderrama 
how he wished to plead on the charge of driving under the influence. R. 65:5. 
Balderrama said: "Guilty." R. 65:5. 
Following Balderrama's statement that he was pleading guilty, the judge asked 
Balderrama what other charges were holding him. R. 65:6. The judge then asked 
whether Balderrama had been drinking and driving. R. 65:6. Balderrama responded that 
he had a couple beers but was not intoxicated. R. 65:6-7. Balderrama also told the judge 
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that the breath test had come back inconclusive and there was no blood alcohol result. 
R. 65:6-7. 
Other than asking Balderrama whether he had been drinking and driving and 
informing Balderrama that he had only thirty days to file a motion to withdraw his plea, 
the judge made no attempt to comply with rule 11 or due process. R. 65. Among other 
things, the judge did not advise Balderrama of the constitutional rights he was waiving or 
the potential penalties for the crime of DUI. R. 65. Nor did the judge use an affidavit or 
videotape. R. 65. 
After accepting the guilty plea, the judge referred Balderrama for a presentence 
report, scheduled a sentencing date and reappointed counsel for the purposes of 
sentencing. R. 65:7. The judge released Balderrama on the charge and told him that as 
soon as he got out of jail, he needed to go to county probation services for the 
preparation of a presentence report. R. 65:7. Balderrama then asked if he could get a 
pretrial release and the judge responded that he was not going to hold Balderrama on this 
charge. R. 65:7. Balderrama repeated his question, indicating that he did not understand 
what was going on. R. 65:7-8. 
MR. BALDERRAMA; So, you're not going to hold me on this no more, your 
Honor? So there's no longer bail? I'm pretty much released. 
THE COURT: Not on this case, but you have other cases, I'm not addressing 
those. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: So, can you please explain to me what's - - what's going 
on? I don't really understand what you're telling me. 
THE COURT: You need to go to Probation Services and get a pre-sentence 
report. We'll let them know that you're in jail and they'll probably come to you 
there. If you get out quickly, then you need to go to them, we'll give you the 
address. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Thank you, your Honor. You're no longer holding me on 
this (inaudible) until I see the Court, right? See the pre-sentence report; is that 
what it is? 
THE COURT: I've told you three times. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Right. I just really don 7 understand the law, your Honor. 
R. 65:7-8 (emphasis added). The plea hearing then concluded. 
Balderrama met with the presentence interviewer on July 2, 2002. R. 25. 
Balderrama maintained his innocence and told the interviewer that he intended to 
withdraw his plea. R. 25. According to the interviewer, Balderrama decided to 
withdraw his plea "when it became apparent to him that pleading guilty would not simply 
'get this over with' as he had assumed, and that he would be required to abide by at least 
the minimum mandatory statutory guidelines." R. 25. 
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
R. 26. The basis for the withdrawal articulated in the motion was that an attorney was 
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not present. R. 26. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, counsel 
argued that the plea was taken in violation of State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 
1987) and Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, that Balderrama did not knowingly waive his right to 
counsel, and that Balderrama did not understand his rights when he pled guilty. 
R. 66:2-5, 6, 7. 
When defense counsel told the judge that Balderrama was not aware of his rights, 
the judge responded,"... well, it seems like he knows enough about them to tell you what 
they are." R. 66:7. The judge also suggested that a waiver of counsel pursuant to 
Frampton was not necessary when the charge was for a misdemeanor. R. 66:3. The 
judge denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, stating that defense counsel had not 
provided any evidence demonstrating that the plea was not knowing. R. 66:9. The judge 
then proceeded with sentencing and imposed a jail sentence despite the claim that 
Shelton was being violated. R. 66:3, 6, 12-13. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Balderrama's Right to Counsel Was Violated. The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel applies in any case where a defendant receives an actual or suspended 
jail sentence. Because the penalty for DUI includes a mandatory jail sentence and 
Balderrama was sentenced to an actual as well as suspended jail sentence, Balderrama 
had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he entered his guilty plea. 
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Balderrama's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated in this case where 
the trial court failed to conduct a colloquy that demonstrated a constitutionally adequate 
waiver of the right to counsel. The trial court did not ascertain whether Balderrama 
possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
representing himself, did not ascertain whether Balderrama understood the nature of the 
charges and proceedings, did not inform Balderrama of the potential penalties, and did 
not otherwise make Balderrama aware of the dangers and disadvantages of representing 
himself or establish that Balderrama knew what he was doing. Moreover, while there are 
no exceptional circumstances that would justify the review of the entire record in this 
case, even if the entire record is reviewed, it fails to demonstrate a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of the right to counsel and instead shows that Balderrama was confused 
and did not understand the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. 
The violation of the Sixth Amendment requires that the trial court's denial of 
Balderrama's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be reversed. Moreover, the actual and 
suspended jail sentences were illegally imposed. This issue was preserved for review, 
but even if it was not, this Court can vacate the plea and sentence pursuant to the plain 
error doctrine. 
Point II. The Plea was Taken in Violation of Due Process and Rule 11. The plea 
was also taken in violation of due process and rule 11. The trial court did not inform 
Balderrama of the nature or elements of the charge or the potential penalty and did not 
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make sure that Balderrama understood the relationship between his conduct and the law. 
Additionally, the trial court did not inform Balderrama of the constitutional rights he was 
waiving by pleading guilty and did not make sure that Balderrama understood that he 
was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. Moreover, the trial court made no effort to 
comply with rule 11 and violated numerous provisions of that rule. 
Balderrama preserved his claim that his plea should be withdrawn because the 
trial court did not strictly comply with due process and rule 11 by informing the trial 
court at the motion to withdraw the plea hearing that Balderrama had not understood his 
rights. Even if this claim was not preserved, however, Balderrama's plea should be 
vacated because the trial court committed plain error in taking that plea. 
Balderrama filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court 
therefore has jurisdiction to conduct a plain error review of that plea. 
The trial court's failure to strictly comply with due process and rule 11 was 
obvious in light of case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court as well 
as the language of rule 11. The error was harmful and requires vacation of the plea as 
recognized by Utah appellate courts in many cases. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE VIOLATION OF BALDERRAMA'S RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL REQUIRES THAT THE PLEA AND JAIL SENTENCE BE 
VACATED. 
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At the plea hearing, the trial court did not conduct a colloquy to determine 
whether Balderrama understood the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without 
counsel and did not otherwise make any effort to determine whether Balderrama 
knowingly waived his right to counsel. Instead, the trial judge simply informed 
Balderrama that he had a right to court appointed counsel and asked whether Balderrama 
waived that right. R. 65:3-4. In addition to the lack of adequate colloquy, the record as a 
whole demonstrates that Balderrama did not knowingly waive the right to counsel. 
Because Balderrama did not knowingly waive the right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment 
was violated in taking the plea. This Sixth Amendment violation requires that the plea 
be withdrawn and that the jail sentence be stricken. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
BALDERRAMA TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA AND IN 
IMPOSING A JAIL SENTENCE WHERE THE RECORD 
DEMONSTRATES THAT BALDERRAMA'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED IN TAKING THE PLEA. 
1. The plea was taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment because 
Balderrama did not make a constitutionally valid waiver of his right to 
counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, n[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.11 This amendment, applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to counsel and requires 
appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917 (citing 
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inter alia Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963) and Johnson v. Zerbst. 
304 U.S. 458,462-63 (1938)); s_ee also Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1999); 
Argersinger v.Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Shelton. 535 U.S. 654. 
The constitutional right to counsel applies to misdemeanors as well as felonies 
whenever actual imprisonment or a suspended jail sentence is involved. Argersinger, 
407 U.S. at 28-37; Shehon, 535 U.S. 654. In Argersinger. the Court recognized the 
importance of the right to counsel in ensuring the fairness of a proceeding, and held "that 
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, 
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by 
counsel at trial." Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31, 37. The United States Supreme Court 
recently reiterated the importance of the right to counsel, and clarified that such right 
attaches any time a jail sentence or suspended jail sentence is imposed. See Shehon, 535 
U.S. at 654. 
Because the penalty for DUI includes a mandatory jail sentence (see. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(4) (Supp. 2002)), a defendant charged with DUI has a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. In this case, where Balderrama was being held in jail when he pleaded 
guilty and was subsequently sentenced to an actual as well as a suspended jail sentence, 
there is no question that Balderrama had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea 
hearing. 
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Violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "stands as a jurisdictional bar 
to a valid conviction and sentence depriving [a defendant] of his life or his liberty." 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467. In other words, unless the right to counsel is properly waived, 
a court cannot enter a valid conviction or sentence. Id.; see also Argersinger. 407 U.S. 
at31. 
Because of the fundamental and important role played by the right to counsel in a 
criminal proceeding, courts are required to "jealously protect[]" that right. Heaton. 958 
P.2d at 917. The trial judge has the "weighty responsibility ... of determining whether 
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." IdL_; see also State v. 
Bakalov. 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" Bakalov I"): State v. Bakalov. 862 
P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) f Bakalov 11"): Frampton. 737 P.2d at 187. There is a 
presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, "and doubts concerning waiver must 
be resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917; see State v. Arguelles, 
2002 UT 104, T}70,459 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 ("we indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver of the right [to counsel]"). 
"[B]efore the court may permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of 
counsel, the court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of 
insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
reiterated that"... before a defendant can waive the right to counsel, 'the defendant 
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"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that 
the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open."'" Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, f70 (further citations omitted); sjee. also State v. White, 
56 N.Y.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that waiver of the right to counsel is 
not "a routine rubber-stampable formality . . . " and that "'a right too easily waived is no 
right at all'" (further citation omitted)). 
The "preferred method of establishing the validity of a waiver is a colloquy on the 
record between the court and the defendant." Arguelles , 2002 UT 104, ^ [70. This Court 
and the Supreme Court have repeatedly outlined the minimum requirements for such a 
colloquy, requiring that the trial court: 
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as 
well as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that the 
defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the 
consequences of the decision to represent himself, including the expectation that 
the defendant will comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting 
a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the 
defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of 
permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad 
understanding of the case. 
ML (citing Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; State v. Petty. 2001 UT App 396,1J6, 38 P.3d 998, 
cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 1992)); see also Frampton. 737 P.2d at 186-87 n. 12 
(outlining questions a trial court could ask in ascertaining whether a defendant 
knowingly waives the right to counsel). "[0]n appeal, [the] focus is not solely on the 
trial court's express advice, [the court] must also examine whether the colloquy clearly 
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establishes the defendant's level of understanding.1' Petty. 2001 UT App 396, %6 (citing 
State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (further citation omitted)). 
When a trial court does not conduct a colloquy with the defendant to determine 
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to counsel, appellate 
courts "will look to the record and make a de novo determination regarding the validity 
of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances." Heaton. 958 P.2d at 918. 
In making that review, "M'[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" 
of the [right to counsel].'" Id. at 917 (citations omitted). 
In Petty, this Court held that Petty had not knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Petty. 2001 UT App 396, Tfl 1-
12. After being informed that Petty wished to represent himself, the trial court conducted 
a brief colloquy with Petty. Icl at %7. During that colloquy, the trial court questioned 
Petty about his education and understanding of the system and advised him against 
proceeding without counsel. Id. 
The trial court inquired about Petty's education, his general understanding of the 
legal system, his knowledge of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, and 
informed him that he had the right to counsel as well as the right to proceed 
pro se. The trial court also advised Petty against proceeding pro se and selected 
Petty's appointed counsel to act in a standby capacity. 
Id. The trial court did not, however, "address whether Petty '"comprehended the nature 
of the charges and proceedings"' or '"the range of permissible punishments."' Id. 
(quoting Heaton. 958 P.2d at 918) (further citation omitted). This Court concluded that 
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"absent a discussion of the nature of the charges and the range of possible penalties Petty 
faced, we cannot say that Petty had a proper understanding of the ' "dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation."'" Id. at ]f8 (further citations omitted). Because the 
trial court "failed to ensure that Petty was fully informed of the risks involved when he 
made his choice to proceed pro se," this Court reversed Petty's conviction and remanded 
the case for a new trial. IcL at ^ [12. 
This Court's decision in Petty mandates that the conviction in this case be vacated. 
Like the judge in Petty, the trial judge in this case failed to discuss the nature of the 
charges and proceedings as well as the range of possible penalties. See id. at f^ 12. The 
trial judge did not tell Balderrama the elements of the crime of driving under the 
influence or the penalty attached to that crime. This alone demonstrates that Balderrama 
did not knowingly and intelligently waive counsel. In addition, the trial judge in this 
case did not inquire about Balderrama's level of education, his understanding of the legal 
system, his knowledge of the rules of evidence and procedure, or make any effort to 
ascertain whether Balderrama possessed the intelligence and capacity to proceed without 
counsel. The colloquy in this case was therefore even more deficient than the colloquy in 
Petty. See id. at %1. 
Rather than conducting an adequate colloquy, the judge simply asked Balderrama 
whether he waived his right to counsel, without making Balderrama aware in any way of 
the dangers and disadvantages of waiving counsel or the possible penalty he faced. An 
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examination of the colloquy in this case, like that in Petty, demonstrates f,no indication of 
[Balderrama's] level of understanding concerning the nature of the charges against him, 
or the range of possible penalties he faced." Id. at Tfll. 
The trial judge seemed to think that because Balderrama pled guilty, the judge was 
not required to question Balderrama as diligently as he would have been had Balderrama 
gone to trial or otherwise ascertain whether Balderrama understood the risks and 
disadvantages if proceeding without counsel. R. 66:3, 5-6. On the contrary, in order to 
ensure that a defendant understands the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without 
counsel, a trial court must ascertain whether the defendant understands the protections he 
is afforded, the nature of the proceedings, the potential penalties he is facing, and the 
alternatives available to him; this is especially important when a defendant is thinking 
about pleading guilty without legal assistance, thereby agreeing that a conviction be 
entered against him, and necessarily requires a determination that the defendant has a 
basic understanding of constitutional rights and procedural and evidentiary rules. See 
generally White, 56 N.Y.2d at 118 (vacating guilty plea because waiver of counsel was 
not constitutionally adequate). 
Because the trial court in this case failed to inform Balderrama of the risks and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel or otherwise undertake "a sufficiently 
searching inquiry" (Id. at 117) to ensure that Balderrama understood the risks and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, Balderrama did not make a constitutionally 
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valid waiver of his right to counsel. Balderrama's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was violated when he entered a guilty plea in the absence of counsel. Accordingly, the 
plea must be vacated. 
The deficient colloquy requires that the plea be vacated and lf[t]here are no 
extraordinary circumstances . . . which would justify [an] examination of the record" for 
a de novo determination as to whether Balderrama waived his right to counsel. Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 919. Even if the record as a whole were reviewed, however, such a review 
further demonstrates that Balderrama was not advised of and did not understand the risks 
and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. In fact, a review of the plea hearing 
demonstrates Balderrama's confusion and lack of understanding. R. 65:7-8. 
Balderrama indicated that he was pleading guilty because he just wanted to get out 
of jail. R. 65:4. After Balderrama pled guilty, the judge asked him what other charges 
he was being held on and how much longer he thought he would be held. Balderrama 
responded, "I - -1 don't know, your Honor. I don't - - I'm just of up in the air, I don't 
know anything." R. 65:6. The judge then informed Balderrama that he was to go to 
probation services and get a presentence report as soon as he got out, then return for 
sentencing. R. 65:7. Balderrama asked whether that meant that he would be released. 
R. 65:7. The judge told Balderrama that he would not hold him on this case. Balderrama 
asked, "So there's no longer no bail? I'm pretty much released." R. 65:8. The judge 
again responded that Balderrama was not being held on this case. Balderrama then 
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asked, "So can you please explain to me what's - what's going on? I don't really 
understand what you're telling me." R. 65:8. The judge repeated the instructions and 
Balderrama, still confused, asked, "You're no longer holding me on this (inaudible) until 
I see the Court, right? See the pre-sentence report; is that what it is?" R. 65:8. 
Apparently becoming impatient with Balderrama's confusion, the judge responded, "I've 
told you three times." R. 65:8. The hearing then concluded with Balderrama again 
indicating his lack of understanding, saying "Right. I just really don't understand the 
law." R. 65:8. Balderrama's confusion and difficulty in understanding whether he was 
to be released along with his apparent misunderstanding that he would "just. . . get it 
over with" if he pled guilty demonstrates that he did not understand the nature of the 
proceedings or the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. 
In addition, the remainder of the record fails to suggest that Balderrama was 
informed of or understood the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel or 
the nature of the proceedings and charges. At the arraignment, Balderrama was not 
informed of the charges or the potential penalties. R. 69:2-3; see. transcript of 
arraignment in Addendum E. Instead, the prosecutor indicated that she thought 
Balderrama intended to plead guilty. R. 69:2. Balderrama corrected her and asked that 
an attorney could be appointed so that he could fight the charges. R. 69:2. The pretrial 
conference was not recorded and the trial court file does not contain anything suggesting 
that Ballderrama was informed of the potential penalty for driving under the influence, 
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the elements the state must prove to establish that he was driving under the influence or 
the rights Balderrama would waive if he were to plead guilty without counsel. At the 
motion to withdraw/sentencing hearing, Balderrama and his counsel explained that 
Balderrama did not understand his rights and did not knowingly waive counsel. R. 66. 
Because the record fails to demonstrate that Balderrama was informed of the risks 
and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, the plea was taken in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment and must be vacated. 
2. Imposition of a jail sentence and a suspended jail sentence violated the 
Sixth Amendment and Alabama v. Shelton. 
The trial judge erred not only in refusing to allow Balderrama to withdraw his 
guilty plea, but also in imposing a two-day jail sentence along with a suspended jail 
sentence. In Argersinger. the United States Supreme Court held "that defense counsel 
must be appointed in any criminal prosecution, 'whether classified as petty, misdemeanor 
or felony,' [citation omitted] 'that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief 
period.5" Shelton, 122 S.Ct. at 1767 (quoting Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 33, 37). The 
Court recently reiterated this requirement and clarified that a suspended jail sentence 
cannot be imposed unless counsel is appointed for the defendant. Shelton , 122 S.Ct. at 
1769-74. 
In this case, Balderrama was not represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty. 
As set forth above, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. 
Pursuant to Argersinger and Shelton, the trial court erred in imposing a jail sentence and 
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a suspended jail sentence. 
B. BALDERRAMA'S CLAIM THAT HIS PLEA SHOULD BE 
VACATED AND A SUSPENDED OR ACTUAL JAIL SENTENCE 
COULD NOT BE IMPOSED WAS PRESERVED; EVEN IF IT WAS 
NOT, THE DOCTRINE OF PLAIN ERROR ALLOWS THIS COURT 
TO REVIEW THE ISSUE. 
1. Balderrama's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to withdraw his 
guilty plea is properly before this Court. 
Balderrama preserved his claim that his plea should be vacated because he was 
deprived of his right to counsel by filing a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea on 
these grounds. R. 26. At the hearing, defense counsel was under the impression that the 
matter had been argued by another LDA attorney earlier in the day. R. 66:2*. 
Nevertheless, defense counsel renewed the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing 
that Balderrama's right to counsel was violated in this case where the record did not 
demonstrate a knowing waiver of the right to counsel. R. 66:2-9. The trial court denied 
the motion. R. 66:10. The issue was therefore preserved for review by this Court. 
The trial judge indicated that he denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
because Balderrama did not present any evidence and did not give the judge a transcript 
of prior proceedings. R. 66:8-9. Contrary to the judge's ruling, Balderrama was not 
required to present evidence or provide the court with a transcript of the hearing. The 
1
 There is no record of a hearing on this case during the trial judge's 8:30 a.m. 
calendar and appellate counsel has been unable to locate any recorded hearing in this 
case on July 29, 2002 other than the hearing transcribed in R. 66. 
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record discloses that the trial court did not ensure that Balderrama made a 
constitutionally valid waiver of his right to counsel. R. 65. "A trial judge, like every 
other party to a proceeding, is charged with knowledge of what is in the record." State v. 
Samora, 2002 UT App 384, TJ21, 59 P.3d 604. Even in cases where a trial judge did not 
preside over a previous hearing, the judge is charged with knowledge of what occurred 
on the record in that hearing. Id. In this case, where the trial judge presided over the 
plea hearing and the record shows that a valid waiver was not taken, the trial judge had 
actual knowledge of the proceedings and is charged with knowledge of what occurred on 
the record. 
Alternatively, even if Balderrama had not properly raised this issue, this Court can 
vacate the guilty plea because the judge plainly erred in failing to take a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of the right to counsel. "To establish plain error, an appellant must 
demonstrate that \i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Pecht. 2002 UT 41, TJ18, 48 P.3d 931 
(quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). The fact that Balderrama 
had the right to counsel was obvious in light of Argersinger and Shelton. The error in 
failing to conduct an adequate colloquy so as to ensure that Balderrama knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel was obvious in light ofHeaton, Bakalov L and 
Frampton, among others. The error was harmful and requires reversal because 
Balderrama's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. See. Petty, 2001 UT App 
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396, ^ fl 2 (new trial required where record does not show that defendant understood 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se); Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ^ f 12 (courts 
presume harm under plain error analysis when defendant is not informed of 
constitutional rights being waived); Heaton. 958 P.2d at 919 (new trial required when 
constitutional right to counsel is violated by failing to ensure constitutionally adequate 
waiver of right to counsel). 
2. Balderrama's claim that the judge imposed an actual and suspended jail 
sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Shelton is properly 
before this Court. 
While Balderrama's written motion requested that he be permitted to withdraw his 
guilty plea because he was deprived of his right to counsel, he also argued at the hearing 
that Shelton controlled this case. R. 66: 2, 6. Because Shelton held that neither an actual 
nor a suspended jail sentence can be imposed when the right to counsel is violated, 
defense counsel's argument preserved a claim that a suspended or actual jail sentence 
was unlawful in this case where the record does not demonstrate a waiver of the right to 
counsel. Although the trial court indicated it was familiar with Shelton and Frampton. it 
nevertheless imposed an actual and a suspended jail sentence in this case despite the fact 
that Balderrama was deprived of his right to counsel when he pled guilty. The claim that 
the trial court erred in imposing an actual and suspended jail sentence in this case where 
Balderrama was deprived of his right to counsel when he pled guilty is therefore properly 
before this Court. 
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Alternatively, even if this claim was not properly preserved, this Court can 
nevertheless review the claim pursuant to the doctrine of plain error. "To establish plain 
error, an appellant must demonstrate that '(0 an error exists, (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" Pecht. 2002 UT 41, [^18 
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). As previously outlined, an error exists in this case 
because the trial court sentenced Balderrama to serve an actual and suspended jail 
sentence despite the fact that his right to counsel was violated when he pled guilty. The 
error in sentencing a defendant to jail when the right to counsel has been violated was 
obvious in light of Shelton, issued by the United States Supreme Court about two months 
before the sentencing in this case and referred to by defense counsel. See Shelton, 122 S. 
Ct. 1764; R. 66:2, 6. Moreover, the requirements for waiver of counsel had been 
thoroughly discussed in a number of Utah appellate decisions, including Bakalov I , 
Frampton, and Heaton, prior to the hearing in this case. The error in sentencing 
Balderrama to an actual and suspended jail sentence when the record does not 
demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel was therefore 
obvious. 
The obvious error in sentencing Balderrama to jail in the absence of counsel was 
harmful as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Shelton. In Shelton, the 
Court held that a suspended jail sentence "may not be imposed unless the defendant was 
accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel5 in the prosecution for the crime charged." 
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Shelton, 122 S.Ct. at 1767 (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40). Shelton requires that a 
jail sentence be vacated when an indigent defendant was denied his right to counsel at 
the trial or plea stage. Id. The Utah Supreme Court decision in Heaton likewise requires 
that a conviction be vacated when the right to counsel was violated. Heaton , 958 P.2d at 
919. Moreover, Utah appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court have 
recognized the harmful effect of proceeding at the trial stage without counsel. See 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917, 919 (recognizing prejudicial effect of proceeding without 
counsel where defendant did not waive counsel); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31 (noting that 
,![t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial" and 
pointing out the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel); Gideon , 372 U.S. at 342-
44 (recognizing that assistance of counsel is critical in criminal cases); Petty, 2001 UT 
App 396, Tfl2 (ordering new trial where record failed to demonstrate that defendant 
understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se ). The violation of 
Balderrama's right to counsel was harmful and requires that the jail sentence be vacated. 
POINT II. THE GUILTY PLEA MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT 
WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND RULE 11 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
A. BALDERRAMA'S PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF DUE 
PROCESS AND RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
1. The guilty plea was taken in violation of due process. 
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"A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a 
defendant's due process rights." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). For a plea to be 
knowingly and voluntarily made, the record must show, among other things, that the 
defendant was informed of the nature of the charges and the elements of the crimes 
charged, and understood the relationship of the law to the facts. Gibbons , 740 P.2d at 
1312. In addition, the record must show that the defendant intentionally waived various 
constitutional rights, including the right to trial by jury, the right to confrontation, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). 
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when 
a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable 
to the States by reason of the Fourteenth, [citation omitted]. Second, is the right 
to trial by jury, [citation omitted]. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers, 
[citation omitted]. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal 
rights from a silent record. 
Id at 244. 
f,[T]rial courts bear the burden of ensuring compliance with this rule." State v. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ fll, 22 P.3d 1242 (citing Gibbons , 740 P.2d at 1312, 1313). "This 
means 'that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is 
truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly 
waived his or her constitutional rights.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ [11 (alteration in original) 
(citing State v. Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)). Due process is violated where 
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the record fails to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
constitutional rights or fails to demonstrate that the defendant understood the elements of 
the crimes charged and the relationship between those elements and his actions. Boy kin. 
395 U.S. at 244: see also Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312. 
In Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43, the Court held that plain error occurred where the 
trial judge accepted the defendant's guilty plea "without an affirmative showing that it 
was intelligent and voluntary." Id. at 242. The Court reasoned that a guilty plea is more 
than just a confession since it results in a conviction. IcL at 242. Since admission of a 
confession requires a "'reliable determination on the voluntariness issue/" affirmance of 
a conviction requires that the record show that a guilty plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made. IcL Because the record failed to demonstrate that Boykin was 
informed of the rights he was waiving or the elements of the charge, the Supreme Court 
held that due process was violated in taking the pleas. 
The Utah Supreme Court likewise recognized in Gibbons that due process 
requires that the defendant must be given notice of the nature of the charges, and "must 
understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the 
facts" for a plea to meet due process requirements. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312. 
Additionally, the record must demonstrate that the defendant was informed of and 
understood the rights he was waiving for a guilty plea to be taken in compliance with due 
process. IcL In cases where the record does not show that the defendant was informed of 
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the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty, the elements of the crime charged and 
the factual basis for the plea, due process is violated and the plea must be vacated. See 
e.g. Bovkin. 395 U.S. at 244; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; State v. Breckenridge. 688 
P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). 
The record in this case fails to demonstrate that Balderrama knowingly and 
voluntarily pleaded guilty, as required by due process. The plea was taken in violation of 
due process because the record (1) fails to demonstrate that Balderrama was informed of 
and knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, and (2) fails to 
demonstrate that Balderrama was informed of the elements of the crime to which he pled 
guilty or understood the relationship of his conduct to the law. See R. 65. 
After the prosecutor suggested that if Balderrama pleaded guilty to DUI, the 
remaining minor traffic violations would be dismissed, the judge simply informed 
Balderrama that he was ''charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a 
Class B misdemeanor" and asked Balderrama how he wished to plead. R. 65:5. 
Balderrama responded, "Guilty." R. 65:5. The trial court did not inform Balderrama of 
any of the rights he would be waiving if he were to plead guilty. R. 65. This means that 
the trial judge did not tell Balderrama that he would be waiving his right to a jury trial, 
his privilege against self-incrimination, or his right to confrontation of witnesses, among 
other things. R. 65. The trial judge did not use an affidavit in taking the plea and aside 
from asking Balderrama whether he waived counsel, the judge did not otherwise refer in 
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any way to the rights Balderrama was waiving by pleading guilty. The guilty plea in this 
case was taken in violation of due process where the record fails to demonstrate that the 
trial court informed Balderrama that he would be waiving various constitutional rights, 
including the right to a jury trial, the right to confrontation, and the privilege against self-
incrimination, if he were to plead guilty. See. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-13; Boykin, 395 
U.S. at 243-44. 
The plea was also taken in violation of due process because the record fails to 
demonstrate that Balderrama was informed of the elements of the charge to which he was 
pleading guilty, the potential penalty for DUI, or the relationship between Balderrama's 
actions and the elements of the crime. Gibbons ,740 P.2d at 1312 (citing inter alia 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)). At no point during the plea hearing 
did the judge inform Balderrama of the elements of the crime of driving under the 
influence. After Balderrama indicated that his plea was guilty, the judge asked him about 
other charges. R. 65:5-6. The judge then asked Balderrama whether he had been driving 
and drinking at the time alleged. R. 65:6. Balderrama responded that he had had some 
alcohol to drink but he was not drunk and the test results did not show a blood alcohol 
level. R. 65:6-7. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I did have one drink, your Honor, yes, I did. And I did - -
I did tell the police officer that I did have a couple beers, I was leaving the club, I 
was there for about an hour and had a couple beers and I got pulled over. And 
what happened was, I took the breathalyzer and - - and it came back inconclusive, 
there was not - -1 wasn't drunk, but I didn't have any - -1 mean, I was - -1 did 
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have a drink and I did drive, yes; but the - - the blood thing, or whatever it was, 
the test came back inconclusive. I didn't - - there was no alcohol level. 
R. 65:6-7. Based on Balderrama's admission that he ffhad a couple of beers and [was] 
drinking and driving," the trial judge found that there was a factual basis for the plea and 
entered a conviction. R. 65:7. 
Aside from the fact that the record fails to show that Balderrama was informed of 
the elements of the crime of DUI or that the state must prove those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to convict him, Balderrama's statement demonstrates that he 
did not understand the relationship between his actions and a conviction for DUI. In 
fact, although Balderrama acknowledged that he had been driving, he also indicated that 
he was not drunk and there was no blood alcohol result. In order to be convicted of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a person driving a motor vehicle must either have 
a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater or be under the influence of alcohol to a degree 
that renders him "incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1998). Balderrama's statement that there was no blood alcohol result and he 
was not under the influence of alcohol indicates that there was no basis for a DUI 
conviction. See Id. In the absence of further questioning by the trial judge, this 
statement fails to demonstrate a factual basis for the plea and demonstrates that 
Balderrama did not understand the relationship between the charge of DUI and his 
actions. 
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The judge's finding that there was a factual basis for the plea does not undo the 
due process violation which occurred when the judge failed to inform Balderrama of the 
elements. Regardless of whether there is a factual basis for a plea, a defendant must be 
informed of the elements the state is required to prove in order to knowingly plead guilty. 
In addition, the judge's finding that there was a factual basis for the plea is erroneous 
since Balderrama's statement indicated that he was not drunk and there was no blood 
alcohol result. The judge's statement that "[having] a couple of beers and drinking and 
driving1' constitutes a factual basis for a DUI conviction is incorrect and further 
demonstrates that Balderrama's guilty plea was not knowingly made. A person who 
drinks and drives is not guilty of DUI; instead, an individual must be affected by the 
alcohol to the point where it interferes with the ability to drive or have a blood alcohol 
level of .08 or greater. The record does not demonstrate either of these and therefore 
further fails to demonstrate that the plea was knowingly made. 
Because the trial court failed to advise Balderrama, among other things, of the 
constitutional rights he would be waiving if he were to plead guilty, the elements the 
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him, and the potential penalty for 
DUI, the plea was taken in violation of due process and must be vacated. 
2. The guilty plea was taken in violation of rule 11. Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
The guilty plea also must be vacated since it failed to comply with rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. "Strict compliance with rule 11 is [ ] mandated" and 
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"requires that the trial court personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly 
knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived 
his or her constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." Abeyta, 852 
P.2d at 995 (citing Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309). This means that the trial court must make 
"detailed and specific" findings that all of the criteria of rule 11(e) have been fulfilled. 
State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 2165 217-18 (Utah 1992). Rule 11(e) states in part: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which the plea is entered, including the possibility of imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
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These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn 
statement. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
The Supreme Court reiterated in Maguire that "(1) strict compliance with the 
elements of rule 11 is required in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) said compliance may 
be demonstrated on appeal by reference to the record of the plea proceedings." Maguire, 
830 P. 2d at 217. Quoting this Court's decision in State v. Smith, the Supreme Court 
clarified that such strict compliance with rule 11 must ""be demonstrated on the record at 
the time the . . . plea is entered.'" Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)). 
"It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on the 
record at the time the . . . plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is used to aid 
Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing. The trial court 
must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit 
and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must 
be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course 
of the plea colloquy. Then the affidavit itself, signed by the required parties, can 
be incorporated into the record." 
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18 (quoting Smith, 812 P.2d at 477). 
In the present case, the trial judge made no attempt to comply with rule 11 during 
the plea hearing, did not use a plea affidavit, and did not make the required rule 11 
findings. The multitude of rule 11 violations that occurred in this case require that 
Balderrama's guilty plea be set aside. 
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First, the trial judge did not strictly comply with rule 11(e)(1) because he did not 
ensure that Balderrama knowingly waived his right to counsel. As set forth in Point I 
above, the trial court did not ascertain whether Balderrama understood the risks and 
disadvantages of representing himself and otherwise did not obtain a constitutionally 
valid waiver of the right to counsel. Moreover, while the judge did tell Balderrama that 
he had the right to a lawyer and asked whether he waived that right, the judge did not 
make a finding, as required by rule 11(e)(1), as to whether Balderrama knowingly waived 
his right to counsel. 
Second, the trial judge did not strictly comply with rule 11(e)(2) since he did not 
ascertain whether the pleas were voluntary and did not make a finding on this issue. As 
set forth in subpart (A) of this point, the trial court violated due process in failing to 
inform Balderrama of the rights he would be waiving if he were to plead guilty, failing to 
inform him of the elements of the crime, and failing to clarify the factual basis for the 
plea or to otherwise demonstrate the relationship between Balderrama's conduct and the 
elements of the charge. Additionally, the record demonstrates that Balderrama pled 
guilty only after he was informed that he would not be brought back before the judge for 
two weeks and incorrectly believed that he would resolve things that day by pleading 
guilty. Additionally, the trial court did not make any finding as to whether the plea was 
voluntary, as required by subsection (e)(2) of rule 11. Under these circumstances where 
the record does not demonstrate that the plea was voluntary and the trial court did not 
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make a finding as to the voluntariness of the plea, rule 11(e)(2) was violated. 
Third, the record of the plea hearing shows that the trial judge failed to strictly 
comply with subsection (e)(3) of rule 11 which requires that the judge find that the 
defendant is aware of various constitutional rights he is waiving by pleading guilty. The 
judge did not refer to the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to compel witnesses, or 
the right to confrontation and did not inform Balderrama that he was waiving these rights 
in pleading guilty. R. 65. Nor did the judge make a finding that Balderrama knowingly 
waived these rights. Rule 11(e)(3) was therefore violated in taking the plea. 
Fourth, subsection (e)(4) of rule 11 was also violated in taking this plea. The 
judge did not explain the nature or elements of a DUI charge and did not tell Balderrama 
that the state would have to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
convict him. R. 65. Nor did the judge make a finding that Balderrama understood the 
elements and that the state would have to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
to convict him. In addition, although the judge did find that there was a factual basis for 
the plea, that finding was erroneous because Balderrama's statement indicated that there 
was not a factual basis for the plea. See discussion supra at 32-3. 
The judge also violated subsection (e)(5) of rule 11 which requires that the trial 
judge find that the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence for the crime. 
The judge did not inform Balderrama of the potential sentence and did not make a 
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finding that he knew the minimum and maximum sentence. R. 65. This failure to inform 
Balderrama of the potential sentence is an additional violation of rule 11. 
Additionally, the judge violated subsection (e)(8) of rule 11 which requires that 
the judge find that the defendant was advised that the right to appeal is limited when one 
pleads guilty. The trial judge did not advise Balderrama that the right to appeal would be 
limited if he pled guilty and did not make the required finding that "the defendant has 
been advised that the right of appeal is limited."2 R. 65. 
The trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 in taking the plea. A plea that 
is taken in violation of rule 11 must be vacated. See_ State v. Tarnawiecku 2000 UT App 
186,fl[18-19,5P.3dl222. 
B. THE CLAIMS THAT THE PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF 
DUE PROCESS AND RULE 11 ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT AND REQUIRE THAT THE PLEA BE VACATED. 
1. The due process and rule 11 claims were preserved by counsel's 
argument and Balderrama's statements that Balderrama did not know his 
rights when he pled guilty. 
2
 While the judge asked the prosecutor in front of Balderrama whether there was 
an offer on the case and the prosecutor responded that "the plea to the DUI would 
dismiss all other counts" (R. 65:4-5), the judge did not clearly state that the plea was the 
result of a plea agreement or make a finding to that effect, as required by rule 11(e)(6). 
Similarly, the judge did advise Balderrama that he had thirty days from sentencing in 
which to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but did not make a finding that 
Balderrama had been so informed, as required by rule 11(e)(7). The technical violations 
of these two subsections do not reach the same magnitude as the flagrant violations of 
the other subsections. 
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Balderrama's claims that his plea was taken in violation of due process and 
rule 11 were preserved for appellate review by his argument at the motion to withdraw 
hearing that he was not informed of the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. 
R. 66:5, 7, 8, 10. In his written motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Balderrama stated 
that the ground for withdrawing the plea was that he had been deprived of his right to 
counsel. R. 26. At the hearing, defense counsel also stated that the basis for the motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea was that Balderrama did not have "an attorney present when 
he made his guilty plea." R. 66:6. The judge then asked, "[W]ell, what else?." R. 66:6. 
In response, defense counsel and Balderrama himself told the judge that in addition to 
not knowingly waiving counsel, Balderrama did not know he had certain constitutional 
rights. R. 66:7, 8. Counsel further indicated that Balderrama's right to due process was 
violated. R. 66:8. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It's our argument that it's per se, that if he didn't have 
counsel present, he didn't, he was not fully aware of the rights that he'd be 
waiving at a trial. 
THE COURT: That's the sole - -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That 
THE COURT: - - the sole basis? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, other than the State Constitution and the 
Federal Constitution provisions guaranteeing the right to due process and to a fair 
trial - -
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R. 66:8. Balderrama also told the court he did not know his rights when he pled guilty. 
R. 66:10. 
While the argument for withdrawing the plea focused primarily on the violation of 
the right to counsel, it nevertheless alerted the judge that Balderrama was not informed of 
his rights when he pled guilty. In fact, the judge seemed to suggest that Balderrama 
knew his rights because he pled guilty and that the judge was not required to inform him 
regarding procedural rules or advise him as to the presumption of innocence. R. 66:4-5. 
The judge issued a ruling denying the motion to withdraw the plea. Accordingly, this 
issue is properly preserved for review. 
2. Alternatively, this Court can vacate the plea under the plain error 
doctrine. 
Balderrama filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea in this case. R. 26. 
Because Balderrama filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review that plea for plain error. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, <|[9 (holding that 
an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a plea for plain error when a timely motion 
to withdraw is filed even if that motion does not state the grounds being reviewed).3 
3
 While this Court has jurisdiction to review the unlawful plea because 
Balderrama filed a timely motion to withdraw that plea, Balderrama also maintains that 
his plea could be reviewed pursuant to the doctrines of plain error and exceptional 
circumstances even if he had not filed such a motion. Although this Court has indicated 
that it cannot review a plea for plain error when a motion to withdraw that plea has not 
been filed in the trial court (see Dean, 2002 UT App 323, %1 (citing State v. Reves, 2002 
UT 13, YP-4, 40 P.3d 630)), Balderrama respectfully requests that such conclusion be 
re-examined. 
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This Court's decision that it does not have jurisdiction to review a plea for plain 
error is based on the Supreme Court decision in Reyes. Reyes was before the Supreme 
Court after the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence eight years after 
judgment was entered. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, }^1. Although in the trial court the defendant 
filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, on appeal he did not address the claim that the trial judge had 
improperly denied that motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id., f2. Instead, Reyes 
claimed for the first time that his guilty plea had been entered in violation of rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., ^3. The Supreme Court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the plea. Id. This holding is consistent with other Utah case law 
that limits a review under a rule 22(e) claim to the legality of the sentence and precludes 
review of the underlying conviction when the case is before the court pursuant to 
rule 22(e). See e ^ State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). 
While the Supreme Court in Reyes did go on to say that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the plea because Reyes did not move to withdraw the plea within 
thirty days of conviction (Id, f3), that statement is dictum since the heart of the holding 
in Reyes is based on the fact that the appeal was from an order denying a rule 22(e) 
motion rather than direct appeal of a criminal conviction. Although the Supreme Court 
has suggested in other cases that the right to attack a plea can be extinguished if a timely 
motion to withdraw the plea is not filed (see. Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; State v. Ostler. 
2001 UT 68,1J10, 31 P.3d 528), it has yet to directly address the circumstances in this 
case where a criminal defendant is directly appealing a conviction and arguing that plain 
error requires that a guilty plea that was unquestionably taken in violation of rule 11 and 
due process be vacated. 
Allowing a plain error review of a plea on direct appeal is consistent with the 
federal approach to reviewing patently illegal pleas. See United States v. Vonn. 122 
S.Ct. 1043 (2002). Despite the more limited right to appeal in federal cases, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that it can review a plea for plain error when that 
issue is raised for the first time on direct appeal of a criminal conviction. Id. Reviewing 
a guilty plea for plain error is also consistent with the accepted approach of reviewing 
any criminal conviction for plain error when the defendant has timely appealed that 
conviction and fundamental fairness. 
Moreover, Reyes did not consider whether the exceptional circumstances doctrine 
would allow review of a plainly invalid guilty plea when the issue is raised on direct 
appeal. In this case, exceptional circumstances justify review of the guilty plea because 
Balderrama was deprived of his right to counsel when he entered the plea. 
"The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device' to assure that 
'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.'" 
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A plea must be vacated under the doctrine of plain error where an obvious error 
occurred in taking the plea. See Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ffi[10-12. The trial court error 
in failing to comply with due process and rule 11 in taking Balderrama's plea was 
obvious in light ofBoykin, Gibbons, Arguelles, the language of rule 11, and the 
multitude of cases from this Court and the Utah Supreme Court discussing the due 
process and rule 11 requirements in taking pleas. As set forth previously, the trial court 
failed to comply with most of the rule 11 requirements and failed to discuss the 
constitutional rights Balderrama was waiving by pleading guilty or ensure that 
Balderrama knowingly waived those rights when he pled guilty. The error was harmful 
because "the omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right." Dean, 2002 UT App 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1997) (citation omitted). Due to the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and the 
important role that right plays in the trial court, manifest injustice would result if this 
Court were to refuse to review a plea on direct appeal that was entered without benefit of 
counsel and which is patently illegal. Id. at 8. 
Unlike Reyes where the Supreme Court clearly did not have jurisdiction to review 
the plea because the case was before it more than eight years after judgment on a motion 
to correct illegal sentence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case, including both the 
conviction and the sentence, because Balderrama directly appealed his conviction. It is 
fundamentally unfair to refuse to review a patently unlawful plea on direct appeal, 
particularly where the defendant was not represented by counsel below. Accordingly, 
while this Court need not reach this claim because Balderrama filed a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, Balderrama nevertheless maintains that even if he had not filed 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this Court should review his clearly illegal plea for 
plain error and exceptional circumstances. 
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323, Tfl2. "It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm under a plain 
error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights 
under rule 11." IdL, citing Tarnawieckh 2000 UT App 186, [^18. Because the record 
demonstrates obvious error resulting in harm, the plea must be vacated. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION REQUESTED 
Appellant requests that this Court calendar oral argument in this case and issue a 
written opinion, particularly as to the claim raised in Point I that Appellant's right to 
counsel was violated. Utah trial courts are grappling with the ramifications of the 
decision in Shelton. Although Utah case law indicates that Balderrama did not make a 
constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel, a written decision would 
nevertheless provide valuable guidance for state trial courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Angel Balderrama respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court ruling and order that his guilty plea be vacated. 
DATED this Jnu day of January, 2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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JOEL JONATHAN KITTRELL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
HEATHER BRERETON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 
5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 3.o*& 
day of January, 2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the District Attorney's Office as 
indicated above this day of January, 2003. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE7JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
CITY/STATE Plaintiff Case Number. 
Tape number C # 
Date 7/^ 
Judge/Comm 
lape numoer 
 7M<?/Mv 
Defendant Clerk. m 
D O B : / f i / lS-la^ Plaintiff Counsel , 
Interpreter , . . Defense Counsel fi ./_/%?>± 
HHARfiFfi flfilffl/ti //Mf/M //?/, Amended 
Amended 
THE COUOT SENTENCED THE. DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) Jail. ^/Vy^VU Suspended 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence . -
(2) Fine Amt. $ /o&ft 00 Susp. $ Fee $ Fine Bal $ / ^ Q y ^ 
PJ)-OD S) ft* AT°TALFINE(S) DUE$/^0 
Payment Schedule: Pay %J^2^____ per month/1 st Pmt. Due i/&£&/t/o( Last Pmt. Due 
(3) Court Costs $ 
(4) Community Service/WP through 
(5) Restitution $ Pay to: • Court D Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation /^J-h/jQ • Good Behavior D AP&P Jffl,ACEC • Other 
(7) Terms of probation: / 
• No Further Violations • Counseling thn 
• AA Meetings / wk / month 
u counseling thry\ Y—rr 
 afClasses Q U I / Vlf^ 
/dh D Follow Program / u In/Out Treatment. 
D No Alcohol • Health Testing 
• Antibuse • Crime U# Procedure/ 
• Employment 
• Proof of 
(8) Plea in Abeyance Diversion {/TwA^/y^ /JL/AOS/J . /)/ 
(9) Review / / at 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGEMENT By 
ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT YI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant- shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(bj A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
<o» the defendant knows the minimum a;,a maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mnndainrv nature (•! the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each ofieiwe to wliich a plea JS entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of congee u t h e sentences' 
(6f if the tendered piea i ; a result of a pner plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if c'> what a r i v m c r t ha12 been reached* 
u » tiie defendant has be^ n advi-rd efthe time limits toi filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
OS) the defendant has bet n ad\ised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings ma\ be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or. if used, a -.worn statement reciting these factoi-s after the court has 
established that the defendant lias read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of tho sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically lequired by s t j tu te or rule, a court is nut required to 
inquire into or advice concerning anv collateral consequences of a plea 
d*i Failure to advise the defendant ot the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty dnd mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but raav be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motien under Section 77-13 6 
(g)(1) If i1 appears that the p ,vaca t ing attorney or any other party has 
agreed to lequest or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the ueaeoment shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by th'z court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally tnat any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)d) The judge shall not paiticipafe in piea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney 
12) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosuie of the tenttitive agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
mav then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and deft use counsel whether the 
piepo^ed dispo'-it'on will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides thai final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilt}, guilty and mentally ill. or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who pievails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j» When a dc fendant tenders a plea of guilt v and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. N 77-llia-l03. 
(Amended tffeetive Mav 1, 1993, January I. 1996, November 1. 1997; Novem-
ber 1,2001. ' 
ADDENDUM C 
FILED DISTRICT COURT IIS 
Third Judicial District 
JOEL J. KITTRELL (9071) ,
 ? ?QQ2 
Attorney for Defendant J U L ' ' L" j 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association SALT LAKE COUNTY Jn 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 By- o^SfaSST 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff : 
-v- : 
ANGEL BALDERAMMA : CASE NO. 015910233 
JUDGE MAUGHAN 
Defendant : 
Comes now Defendant, ANGEL BALDERAMMA, by and through counsel, JOEL J. 
KITTRELL, and hereby moves this Court to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that no 
attorney was present for defendant. 
• / 
DATED this l b ^ day of May, 1000. 
1 
L,... 
JOEL J. KITTRELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of The District Attorney, 
2001 South State St., Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 this r^> day of July, 2002. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANGEL BALDERRAMA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 015910233MS 
ENTRY OF PLEA/BENCH 
WARRANT HEARING 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 10th day of June, 
2002, commencing at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: CHRISTOPHER BOWN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: ANGEL BALDERRAMA 
Appearing Pro Se 
FILED 
Uteh Court of Appeals 
UBB 
)C» '«SSSs* 
Pauisits St*%y £ 
Clerk of the Court 
-AN P. SMITlfcSR ^ ^ ^ - * 1 
ORIGINAL 
AL  
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (001) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Is anybody else ready on a matter? If 
not, do we have Angel Balderrama? 
MR. BOWN: Oh, yes, we do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Balderrama, do you need an 
interpreter? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you—this was set for a jury trial 
and you failed to appear; why was that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I was on probation with Daniel 
Anderson. I had a—a little problem, I was supposed—I had—I 
came up with a dirty U.A. I was supposed to turn myself in on 
a Thursday, like three months ago. I got a call that morning 
from Child Protective Service saying that my son was taken 
away from me, they found him in a motel room with the mother. 
And I called my probation officer and I asked her if I could— 
if she'd give me a little bit more time to turn myself in, so 
I could wait out the court date, 'cause you know, how could a 
parent come to jail not knowing what's going to happen to his 
kids? And he lived with me and I just let him go with my— 
with his mother so I could—so I could come to jail the next 
day. 
Well, anyway, that's all documented and everything 
and anyways, so I called my probation officer and I told her 
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that I—that I needed some more time. She told me no and I—I 
just—I couldn't deal with it, you know, my kid being gone and 
not knowing—coming to jail and not knowing what's going to 
happen to him. 
THE COURT: How long have you been in jail? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I've been here since last week, but 
I—I've had time ser—I got time served on these charges 
before, I did time on them already. 
THE COURT: We'll have you come back at 1:30 this 
afternoon— 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I have a—I have another afternoon 
court, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll come back on June 24th 
at 1:30. Set it for pre-trial, we'll notify your attorney 
that you're here and we'll see if we can resolve it then. If 
not, we'll set it for trial. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I would like to resolve it today if 
there—if there's any possible way, your Honor. I would 
really like to resolve it today. I want to take care of 
everything. I would like to start—whatever's going to 
happen, I would like to happen today, if you don't mind, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Balderrama, you are entitled to an 
attorney, do you understand that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
3 
THE COURT: If you can't afford one, we'd appoint 
one for you; do you understand that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: In fact, we already have. And if you go 
forward today, you'll be waiving your right to an attorney; do 
you understand that? 
Do you understand that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is anybody forcing you to do this? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: No, your Honor. I just want to get 
out so I can take care of my kid, your Honor. I just want to 
get ready and do my time and if there's any, just want to get-
-get it over with, so I can get out and take care of my kids, 
your Honor, to— 
THE COURT: Mr. Bown, I know this isn't your case 
and you probably don't have a file on it. 
MR. BOWN: I do not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's a misdemeanor DUI, with—in 
addition to the DUI, it's driving on a denied license, 
speeding and improper lane change. 
Mr. Balderrama wishes to—he's waived his right to 
an attorney and would like to resolve it this morning; any 
objection from the State? 
MR. BOWN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there an offer on this at all? 
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MR. BOWN: I don't deal with (inaudible) it's been a 
long time since I've done those. I—I would think that in 
this case, the plea to the DUI would dismiss all the other 
counts,— 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BOWN: —would be appropriate. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Mr. Balderrama, you're charged with driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, a Class B misdemeanor that 
occurred February 27th of 2001 on northbound 1-15 at 1000 
South in Salt Lake County. 
How do you wish to plead? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Guilty, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you had more than one DUI in the 
last ten years? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: No. 
THE COURT: This is the first offense? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes. 
THE COURT: What are you serving a commitment for 
right now? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I am still going to court on the 
other charges. I'm not serving any time right now. I'm just 
waiting for— 
THE COURT: Well, you said you got credit for time 
served. 
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MR, BALDERRAMA: That's—that's for my other charges 
that I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: What—what are they? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: It's a joy riding with intent, I 
think it's a third-degree felony, and tamp—tampering with a 
witness which is a Class A, but that's with another judge, 
that's what I—I'm here—I'm here for a probation violation is 
what it is. 
THE COURT: For the joy riding? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yeah, the joy riding and the 
tampering. 
THE COURT: And what, do you have this afternoon? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I don't know. I—it might be for 
the joy riding, third-degree felony. I'm not sure. 
THE COURT: How much longer do you anticipate being 
held? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I—I don't know, your Honor. I 
don't—I'm just of up in the air, I don't know anything, 
really. 
THE COURT: Mr. Balderrama, had you been driving and 
drinking at the time, on February 27th? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: I did have a drink, your Honor, 
yes, I did. And I did—I did tell the police officer that I 
did have a couple beers, I was leaving the club, I was there 
for about an hour and had a couple beers and I got pulled 
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over. And what happened was, I took the breathalyzer and—and 
it came back inconclusive, there was not—I wasn't drunk, but 
I didn't have any—I mean, I was—I did have a drink and I did 
drive, yes; but the—the blood thing, or whatever it was, the 
test came back inconclusive. I didn't—there was no alcohol 
level. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, based upon your admission 
that you'd had—you'd had a couple of beers and drinking and 
driving, I find the factual basis for your plea, I'm going to 
enter it as a conviction. 
Any attempt to withdraw the plea has to be filed in 
writing, based on good cause, within 30 days of sentencing. 
I'm going to order a pre-sentence report and have you back for 
sentencing. This can be through County Probation Services. 
We'll have you back on July 29th at 1:30 for 
sentencing. We'll appoint you an attorney for the purposes of 
sentencing. That means as soon as you get out, you need to go 
to them if they haven't come to you while you're in jail; do 
you understand that? 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, I do, your Honor. And do— 
does this mean, can I—can I get like a—maybe like a pre-
trial release on this, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to hold you on this, 
I can't do anything (inaudible) 
MR. BALDERRAMA: So, you're not going to hold me on 
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this no more then, your Honor? So, there's no longer no bail? 
I'm pretty much released. 
THE COURT: Not on this case, but you have other 
cases, I'm not addressing those. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: So, can you please explain to me 
what's—what's going on? I don't really understand what 
you're telling me. 
THE COURT: You need to go to Probation Services and 
get a pre-sentence report. We'll let them know that you're in 
jail and they'll probably come to you there. If you get out 
quickly, then you need to go to them, we'll give you their 
address. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BALDERRXMA: Thank you, your Honor. 
You're no longer holding me on this (inaudible) 
until I see the Court? right? See the pre-sentence report; is 
that what it is? 
THE COURT: I've told you three times. 
MR. BALDERRAMA: Right. I just really don't 
understand the law, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, to the 
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of 
October, 2002. 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day 
of October, 2002. 
Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah, 
do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge, 
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except 
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings 
were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of 
October, 2002. 
Nbtary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHf ' r \ i c h v / \ L 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
ANGEL BALDERRAMA, 
Case No. 015910233MS 
Defendant. 
Arraignment Arraignment - - >. < r *%n 
Electronically Recorded on hy CA.^ ' * ^0% 
December 13f 2001 *^ - ~ ^ 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
CARA TANGARO 
District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: ( 801)363-7900 
ANGEL BALDERRAMA 
(Appeared pro se) 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe CSR/CCT 
1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
Zdo&incA 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 13, 2001) 
3 MR. BALDERRAMA: Your Honor, she doesn't have me on her 
4 calendar, so if you can call me. 
5 THE COURT: What is your name? 
6 MR. BALDERRAMA: Angel Balderrama. 
7 MS. TANGARO: Do you have it on yours? We're ready on 
8 all three of them. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MS. TANGARO: So I can call him first. 
11 THE COURT: Balderrama. 
12 MS. TANGARO: No. 5 on your calendar, I believe. 
13 THE COURT: Sure. What will he be pleading? 
14 MS. TANGARO: I think he just wanted to plead guilty. 
15 MR. BALDERRAMA: No. 
16 MS. TANGARO: Or plead not guilty, right? 
17 MR. BALDERRAMA: Plead not guilty and get a public 
18 defender appointed to me. I'm not — I work, but it's off and 
19 on with a temp agency. Also, all of the fines that I pay, so I 
20 couldn't really afford them right now. The reason for a public 
21 defender is I want to get the police reports and whatnot and 
22 see what was said. Pretty much going to try to fight it. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. We'll appoint you a legal defender 
24 and set it for pretrial on February the 4th at 1:30. 
25 MR. BALDERRAMA: Thank you. 
-3-
1 I THE COURT: Thank you. Actually, we could do this. We 
2 could do this one January 7rh. Is there any reason you couldn't 
3 be here? 
4 MR. BALDERRAMA: I have classes that day, (inaudible) 
5 treatment classes. I have them every other day, so I would 
6 have to look on the calendar and look and see -- what day is 
7 that? January 7'h, what day? 
8 THE COURT: It's a Monday. 
9 MR. BALDERRAMA: (Inaudible) day would be better. 
10 THE COURT: February 4fh? 
11 MR. BALDERRAMA: Yes, that will be fine, because I have 
12 my classes that end the end of January. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 J (Hearing concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed un^er ^Y 
direction from the transmitter records made or 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, *"d 
contains all of the evidence and all matters h e 
same related which were audible through said recording 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identifi?J. ^ f 1 * 
record, and therefore, the name associated with ™ 
statement may not be the correct name as to tne P 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 2 6th day of Dece 
2002. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
Beverly Lowe 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
